

The C1098 “Bage Pitch” and Hereford Bypass Phase One

Evidence note: induced traffic, the assessment gap, and the case for committed mitigation

Status: Working draft for the residents’ group — for use in CPO/SRO objections, parish council representations, and correspondence with Herefordshire Council. **Prepared:** August 2026. All findings are referenced to source documents listed in the register at the end.

1. Summary

Herefordshire Council is constructing Phase One of the Hereford Bypass (formerly the Southern Link Road, “SLR”) under a planning permission granted in July 2016 (ref. P151314/F) and kept alive by a nominal commencement of works in July 2019. Construction is programmed to begin in December 2026, with the Full Business Case (FBC) published in August 2026.

The FBC and the CPO Statement of Reasons acknowledge, for the first time, that the scheme will change traffic on rural roads — while the C1098 “Bage Pitch”, the first crossing of the River Wye west of Hereford and an established rat run avoiding the A49 Greyfriars Bridge, faces induced traffic from the scheme.

This note demonstrates, from the council’s own application documents, that:

1. **The C1098 was never assessed.** It sat outside the formally scoped study area of the 2015 Transport Assessment and appears nowhere in the air quality or noise assessment data.
2. **The assessment method could not have detected the harm even if the road had been in scope.** Decreasing links were excluded from analysis, increases under 30 PCU/hour were dismissed, and all results used unconstrained “demand flows” — an approach structurally blind to congestion-driven diversion, which is precisely the mechanism that creates rat running.
3. **Both highway regulators recorded, pre-consent, that the long-term evidence was method-limited.** The Highways Agency and its consultants JMP noted in writing that unconstrained outputs were the only way to produce “any valid information” for the SLR alone, because the network requires the (uncommitted) Western Relief Road to function by 2032.
4. **The scheme’s own operating concept uses TROs on existing roads to steer its traffic.** The modelling assumed, and planning condition 21 requires, a weight-restriction order on the A465 Belmont Road so that traffic transfers to the new road. A C1098 restriction serves the same objective — traffic onto the road built to carry it — and the wider package’s own toolkit includes through-traffic restriction of residential roads.
5. **The council has already accepted the C1098 is unsuitable for the traffic in question.** Its 2018 reviews record a road 4–7 m wide, signed “Unsuitable for HGVs”, with residents “almost to a person” seeking limits — and its refusal of a weight restriction

rested solely on the absence of a suitable alternative route, an absence the bypass itself now cures for strategic movements and, with Phase 2, entirely.

6. **The first competent assessment — the 2025 traffic study on a 2023 base model — has found the effect the 2015 work could not see**, per the FBC’s own admission of induced traffic on the C1098, yet no mitigation is committed.

The residents’ ask is therefore **not** opposition to the scheme. It is that the council convert its own admission into a binding commitment: a monitoring regime on the C1098 with defined thresholds triggering a pre-agreed mitigation package, funded from the scheme budget.

2. Scheme status and decision timeline

Date	Event	Source
18 Jul 2016	Planning permission P151314/F granted with 21 conditions	AECOM Review §2.2
14 Mar 2019	2018 Side Roads Order confirmed by Secretary of State	Cabinet decision Dec 2025
1–18 Jul 2019	Nominal commencement (earthworks, unbound pavement, fencing, chainage 1150–1300m); LPA confirmation letter 25 Jul 2019	AECOM Review §2.3
Mar 2024	Cabinet revives scheme (New Road Strategy); AECOM validity review published as Appendix A	AECOM Review
Dec 2025	Cabinet resolves to make CPO 2026 and (if required) a new SRO; draft Statement of Reasons published	Cabinet decision Dec 2025
Mar 2026	Graham appointed (detailed design, with AtkinsRéalis); final construction contract award due summer 2026	Council news, Mar 2026
Aug 2026	Full Business Case published	Council news, Aug 2026
Dec 2026	Construction programmed to start	Council webpages

Note on forums: the CPO/SRO advertisement, when it comes (local newspaper for two successive weeks, site notices, personal service on qualifying interests), opens the statutory objection window — typically a minimum of 21 days. As at early August 2026 no advertisement has been identified. Land is being acquired by agreement in parallel and settled parcels are removed from the CPO, so the orders may be confirmed unopposed or never advertised at full scope; the campaign therefore cannot rely solely on the statutory route.

3. Findings

F1 — The C1098 was outside the study area of the Transport Assessment

The 2015 TA defines its link-flow study area exhaustively (TA §7.5.4): the SLR and Clehonger Link; sections of the A49(T), A465 and B4349; Walnut Tree Avenue and Holme Lacy Road; and “selected rural routes south-west of Hereford” — naming only the **C1126 Haywood Lane, C1227 Grafton Lane and the B4348**. The study area was expressly “limited to the locations shown on Figure 7.1” (TA §7.5.1). The C1098 does not appear.

The original scoping note (Nov 2014, TA Appendix B, §3.4.6) proposed an even narrower study area — capacity analysis at the two SLR junctions and flows at two A49(T) junctions only.

Corroboration: the C1098 is absent from the affected-roads traffic data underpinning the air quality assessment (ES Appendix 5.1) and from the noise assessment data (ES Appendix 11.3). *[Verified by resident review of both appendices, August 2026.]*

F2 — The claimed benefit to “rural roads south-west of Hereford” rests on three named lanes

The executive summary and conclusions (TA §9.2.4) state that traffic will decrease on “rural roads south-west of Hereford”. The analysis behind this claim (TA §§8.3.13–8.3.15, 8.4.10–8.4.12; Briefing Note §4, Table D) covers only Haywood Lane, the B4348 and the C1228. The Statement of Reasons (§5.26) repeats near-identical wording for the 2025 modelling, now softened to “**some** rural roads south-west of Hereford”. At no point has any published assessment claimed a benefit to — or examined any effect on — the C1098 or the wider western arc.

F3 — The assessment method was structurally incapable of identifying induced traffic on the C1098

Three methodological choices, each recorded in the application documents, combine to make the 2015–16 evidence base blind to the C1098 problem:

- **Decreases and small increases excluded from analysis.** Links forecast to reduce were “omitted from further analysis”; increases of 30 PCU/hour or less were “categorised as having a negligible impact” and likewise omitted (TA §7.5.2).
- **Demand flows throughout.** All assessments used demand flows — traffic which *wishes* to pass — rather than actual flows constrained by queues (TA §7.3.4; Briefing Note §§2.4–2.5). Rat running is a *response to congestion*; an assignment that ignores what queues do to route choice removes the causal mechanism by construction. The consultants’ claim that demand flows are a “worst case” holds for junction loading, not for network diversion effects — and the Briefing Note itself concedes the difference between demand and actual flows *increases* “as traffic levels rise and congestion increases by 2032” (§2.5), i.e. the presentation is least reliable exactly where and when the C1098 problem materialises.
- **No mitigation duty attached to the long term.** The mitigation test was confined to the 2017 opening year; the 2032 scenarios were “presented solely to give an indication of

future transport conditions” / “for information only” (TA §§7.2.2, 8.4.1). The TA concludes no further measures are necessary to mitigate residual impacts (§9.2.12).

F4 — Both highway regulators recorded, pre-consent, that the long-term SLR-only evidence was method-limited

- **Highways Agency letter, 1 December 2014 (TA Appendix B), point 8:** the Agency noted that an approach using unconstrained demand “is necessary to allow any valid information to be produced due to need for the wider Western Relief Road being identified as necessary to deliver the full Core Strategy” growth.
- **JMP Technical Note, March 2015 (TA Appendix B), §1.10:** the 2032 flow diagrams are “for unconstrained traffic movement, i.e. traffic will route without limitations imposed by road capacity”; “whilst not ideal”, the reason is that the 2032 SATURN model assumes the uncommitted Western Relief Road and supporting transport strategy are included “to ensure the city would continue to function in transport terms” — and a constrained run of the SLR in isolation would have generated “no useful flow information”.
- **TA §7.3.1** confirms the assessment scenarios exclude a future Western Relief Road, “agreed with the Highways Agency”.

Read together: the functioning long-term model needs a second river crossing; strip it out and a realistic (constrained) run of Phase One alone fails; so the only long-term SLR-standalone evidence ever produced came from a method that cannot represent congestion-driven diversion. Every historic forecast suggesting rural roads benefit either assumed a river crossing Phase One does not provide, or used a method blind to the C1098 mechanism.

F5 — The consultants had the tools to find the problem, and used them — pointed the other way

The September 2015 Briefing Note (doc 122) contains a full rat-run analysis for the *southern* arc: select link (origin–destination) analysis for Haywood Lane, the B4348 and the C1228 (Tables A & B), quantified relief figures (Table D), junction-by-junction rerouting narratives, and the conclusion that the SLR delivers “significant traffic relief to the east-west rat runs to the south of Hereford” (§4.16). The four corridors examined (§3.1) are all south and east of the scheme.

Critically, the model’s own O–D tables identify “**A49 Greyfriars Bridge**” as an origin/destination for rat-run traffic (Table A — up to 20% of AM northbound Haywood Lane traffic). The congestion point that drives the C1098 rat run was therefore explicitly represented in the modelling and known to drive rat-running behaviour — yet the analysis was never extended to ask which *other* routes Greyfriars pressure diverts traffic onto. The Briefing Note also concedes the model network “includes all the major connecting routes but not every side street” (§2.2), leaving open whether the C1098 was adequately coded at all.

F6 — Greyfriars Bridge: the scheme does not address the driver of the C1098 rat run

The SLR-only modelling reported Greyfriars Bridge flows essentially unchanged (contemporary analysis of the application forecasts: c.45,000 vehicles/day; TA §8.4.6 records only nominal changes on Greyfriars in 2032). Phase One neither relieves the single-bridge

constraint nor provides an alternative crossing; the network change it *does* make redistributes traffic and journey times around the southern approaches while the western river-crossing pressure remains. The full Western Bypass — with its additional river crossing — was the component that addressed this, and it is not part of Phase One.

F7 — TROs on existing roads are embedded in the scheme’s own operating concept

The traffic case assumed a weight-restriction TRO on the A465 Belmont Road (Great Western Way bridge): “Without the TRO, fewer vehicles would re-route onto the SLR and the changes in traffic flows would be less substantial” (TA §7.3.2; Briefing Note §2.6). Planning condition 21 requires the Belmont Road weight restriction prior to opening (AECOM Review, Table 1), and the 2014 consultation brochure states all route options “would include a weight restriction on the A465”.

The Belmont order is a benefit-realisation measure — it exists to push traffic onto the new road — and the council may seek to distinguish it from a protective order for the C1098 on that basis. Three points defeat the distinction:

1. **Instrument parity.** The scheme’s operating concept treats TROs on existing roads as legitimate levers for delivering the intended distribution of scheme-related traffic; the scheme does not function as consented without one. Having used the instrument to engineer the traffic distribution, the council cannot coherently rule it out where its own FBC shows the distribution going wrong.
2. **A C1098 restriction is itself benefit-realisation.** A through-traffic or weight restriction on the C1098 routes traffic onto the A49 corridor and the new road — the same objective the Belmont order serves: channel traffic onto infrastructure built to carry it, away from roads that cannot. The ask is the Belmont order’s twin, pointed west, and reinforces rather than undermines the scheme’s purpose.
3. **The package’s own toolkit includes protective restriction.** The TA scoping note (doc 84, §2.4.3) records that the wider South Wye Transport Package includes measures “to limit through traffic on residential roads”, delivered as TROs outside the planning application. The protective use of traffic orders on existing roads is therefore already inside the programme, in the council’s own description of it.

F8 — The 2016 permission’s evidence base is stale by the council’s own consultant’s account

The AECOM Planning Application and Design Review (Feb 2024, Appendix A to the New Road Strategy Cabinet report) records that: the ecology surveys exceed CIEEM’s three-year lifespan; the HRA screening requires redoing following *People Over Wind*; no climate chapter exists though one would now be required; the cumulative effects assessment is “no longer accurate”; the transport model base years (2012/2016) pre-date COVID and should be rebased per current TAG; and the DfT would expect updated forecasting and appraisal if its funding is engaged. AECOM also flags design departures (e.g. c.10% overtaking provision against a 30% requirement) whose correction may move the detailed design away from the 2016 approved plans and the 2018 SRO scope.

F9 — The first competent assessment has found the effect, and the council resisted releasing it

The CPO Statement of Reasons (§5.26) records that “further modelling was undertaken in 2025 applied to an updated 2023 base model”, with decreases forecast on “some rural roads south-west of Hereford” and increases “on sections of road closest to the new road”. The published FBC (Aug 2026) acknowledges induced traffic on existing roads including the C1098. An FOI request for the 2025 traffic study (Dec 2025) was initially answered “the council do not currently hold this information”, then refused under FOIA s22 (intended for future publication) on the basis the study would be published with the FBC “in July 2026 at the latest” (Internal Review letter, 24 Feb 2026). The FBC is now published: **the s22 basis has expired by its own terms** and the full study, with model outputs, is immediately demandable.

F10 — The assessment horizon has collapsed

The 2032 design year was selected as 15 years post-opening per DMRB (JMP TN §1.9; HA letter point 5; PB response). With opening now circa 2028, a compliant 15-year post-opening horizon is circa **2043**. Whether the 2025 study forecasts to an equivalent horizon — and on what network assumptions regarding later bypass phases — is a central question for disclosure.

F11 — The council’s own bypass surveys counted the C1098 crossing, and the data shows commuter through-traffic

The Hereford Transport Model / Hereford Bypass survey programme (Report of Highway Surveys, WSP | Parsons Brinckerhoff, September 2017; drawing dated 18/11/2016) placed **ATC Site 1 — “Bridge Sollers near A438”** — on the C1098 river crossing itself. November 2016 Monday–Thursday averages: 24-hour flows of 1,138 and 1,152 by direction (~**2,290 vehicles/day two-way, ~1% HGV**); AM period (07:00–10:00) 208/443 by direction, PM (16:00–19:00) 384/241. The average hourly flow profiles are strongly tidal — a pronounced ~08:00 peak in one direction mirrored by a ~17:00 peak in the other — the signature of commuter through-traffic using the crossing, not local movement. The drawing labels the C1098 only as “Un-named Road”.

Implications: (a) the crossing was Site 1 of the bypass’s own data collection — the western crossing was squarely within the scheme’s evidence base from 2016; (b) the 2016-base HTM held observed data for this link, establishing a validation lineage against which the 2023-base model’s treatment of the C1098 can be tested on disclosure; (c) ~2,290 vpd (Nov 2016) is the official pre-scheme baseline against which current counts (Telraam/ATC) and any post-opening monitoring triggers can be anchored.

F12 — The council’s 2018 speed review documents the road’s unsuitability, a 14-year trail of community concern, and the width case for a weight restriction — while closing off a speed-limit-led ask

An ADL Traffic and Highways Engineering briefing note (ref 3409, January 2018), commissioned in response to Madley Parish Council’s **2012** request for a 40 mph limit between Bridge Sollars and Madley, records: carriageway width varying **4–7 metres** over the 4.3 km national-speed-limit section; a road “characterised by a number of noticeably sharp

bends” which, with the narrow carriageway, “act as traffic calming”; no footways except on the bridge section, no street lighting; direct access to 21 dwellings, 25 fields, nine farming businesses, six private lanes and a church; three bridleways and seven footpaths (no equestrian warning signage); SLOW markings and oncoming-vehicle warning signs at Bridge Farm. Six personal-injury collisions were recorded in five years (Jun 2012–May 2017): three on the C1098 itself (loss of control at a bend into an oncoming vehicle; rear shunts; collision with an agricultural vehicle with road layout a stated contributory factor) and two at the A438 junction caused by vehicles waiting to turn to/from the C1098. 85th-percentile speeds were **33.5–37.7 mph** at two locations; the review concluded speeds are self-limited by geometry and recommended against a 40 mph limit, with police concurrence.

Consultation responses on the record include Bishopstone Group Parish Council: speed “probably is not the issue as you cannot get up to speed. But **the road is not wide enough in many places for 2 HGVs to pass**” — and a ward member supporting “a speed limit and a weight limit on the road.”

The full release (FOI, Chris Parnell-Smith) adds the AD report (February 2018), the Record of Officer Decision (9 March 2018, Head of Highways & Community Services), the EINA (Appendix D) and the consultation response summary (Appendix F), which together establish: (a) the C1098 had entered the council’s **prioritised traffic regulation order waiting list** and was assessed under a commission covering “pre-TRO schemes 19 to 26” (ADL ref 3409); (b) **a parallel weight-restriction briefing and decision existed and have been obtained** (see F13); (c) the Stoney Street ward member recorded that residents of Madley and Bridge Sollars “**almost to a person want a speed limit and a weight limit on the road**” and that “the apparent inability to enforce the limits by the Police is one of the main reasons for the refusal” — the refusal rested substantially on enforceability, not on the road’s capacity to absorb traffic; (d) Madley Parish Council’s response warned that “**serious consideration should be given by the county planners to new planning applications which would increase the amount of commercial traffic along the Bridge Sollars Road**” — a formal 2018 warning against traffic-generating decisions affecting this road; (e) **seven-day volume and speed surveys were undertaken at two C1098 locations in November 2017** (AD report §9) — the volume tables have not been released and constitute a second pre-scheme baseline; (f) Bishopstone GPC reported a serious collision (two air ambulances) at the Bridge Sollars crossroads in January 2018, post-dating the validated collision dataset.

Implications: (a) a speed-limit-led ask is foreclosed — the council reviewed and rejected it on 85th-percentile evidence, so the mitigation hierarchy must lead with through-traffic/weight restriction and monitoring; (b) the review is an official record of the road’s physical unsuitability for through-traffic and of the width case for a weight restriction, in the council’s own commissioned words; (c) community requests for protection date to 2012 — the campaign is not opportunistic; (d) the review answered a *speed* question on the road’s then local-access function; it is silent on *volume and composition*, and DfT Circular 01/2013 point 123 — the framework it applied — distinguishes local-access from through-traffic function, so the FBC’s induced traffic is a change of function warranting fresh review (the police response expressly invited re-review on new data); (e) the collision record is a pre-scheme safety baseline, including conflicts already generated at the A438 junction by C1098 traffic.

F13 — The council refused a C1098 weight restriction in 2018 for one reason only: no suitable alternative route existed. The bypass creates it.

The companion weight-restriction review (ADL Briefing Note ref 3409, Jan 2018; AD Report April 2018; Record of Officer Decision, 2 May 2018) assessed Madley PC's 2012 request for a 7.5-tonne (except for access) restriction. It records that the C1098 is already signed **"Unsuitable for HGVs"** — but only at its southern (B4352) end; **there is no such sign at the A438 (Bridge Sollers) end**, the direction from which crossing traffic arrives. Passing places are "few and far between" (one formal, ~20m). ANPR surveys at both ends (9 Nov and 6 Dec 2017, 07:00–19:00) measured **through** HGV movements with no intermediate stop — pure cut-through: 64 and 39 vehicles two-way respectively, of which over-7.5t through movements were ~21 and ~19 — an official pre-scheme baseline for cut-through HGV traffic with a defined, repeatable methodology.

The refusal rests on a single stated reason (AD Report §2): **"To avoid increasing the amount of traffic using unsuitable alternatives"** — the only alternative A438–B4352 link being the C1185 over Bredwardine Bridge (3.7m wide, single-track, "not considered to be suitable for heavy vehicles"), making the C1098 **"the only suitable route** for HGVs and other agricultural vehicles" (§§8–10). The briefing states the governing test: an environmental weight restriction is imposed on routes unsuitable for HGVs **"where there is a better and equally convenient alternative."**

Implications: (a) the council has already accepted the first limb of its own test — the road is unsuitable for HGVs, and signs it as such (advisory signage has since been installed at the A438 end too; its effectiveness has never been monitored, and if post-opening surveys show through-HGVs at or above the 2017 baseline despite full signage, the only non-mandatory instrument is demonstrated to have failed); (b) on the second limb — the alternative route — the position must be put precisely: for **through cars**, the overwhelming component of the forecast induced traffic, the suitable alternative is the A-road network they divert to avoid, so a prohibition-of-through-traffic order faces no 2018-logic obstacle; for **HGVs on strategic movements** the SLR/A49 corridor provides a (longer) alternative from opening; for **A438 ↔ B4352 movements** the equally convenient alternative arrives only with Phase 2 — with the Belmont Road restriction in place, the Phase One route is A49 through Hereford and back west, a penalty lap no officer could call equally convenient. The weight-order commitment should therefore be **staged**: monitoring against the 2017 ANPR baseline from opening, with the order made when the trigger is breached or when later phases supply the western alternative, whichever is earlier; (c) the resulting gap is itself evidence for Phase 2: the council's own 2018 decision establishes that without the western section, the network offers these movements no suitable route except a road the council deems unsuitable — the 2014 HA finding (F4) restated in TRO form; (d) condition 21 creates an unassessed second loading mechanism: with Belmont Road restricted, the C1098 becomes the only unrestricted low-standard link between the A465/B4352 side and the A438 side avoiding Hereford entirely — the Belmont order was modelled for its effect of pushing HGVs onto the SLR, never for its westward displacement onto a road outside the 2015 assessment (add to EIR: does the 2023-base model apply the Belmont restriction, and what HGV routing does it show on the C1098 with it in place?); (e) the decision principle invoked in 2018 — do not let restrictions push traffic onto unsuitable roads — is the very principle the unmitigated scheme offends in reverse; (f) the 2017 ANPR through-HGV counts are a ready-made trigger metric with a

defined, repeatable methodology; (g) the enforceability objection has aged out: the council itself deployed ANPR on this road in 2017, and camera-based enforcement of moving-traffic restrictions by local authorities became available outside London from 2022 (TMA 2004 Part 6).

4. The argument (assembled)

1. The 2016 consent's transport evidence never assessed the C1098: outside the study area (F1), invisible to the method (F3), with the long-term run either assuming a second river crossing or abandoning capacity constraint entirely — as both regulators recorded (F4).
 2. The silence of the 2016 Environmental Statement on the C1098 is therefore an artefact of scoping and method, not a finding of no effect (F1, F3, F5).
 3. The analytical tools to find the effect existed and were used — on the rat runs the scheme relieves, with Greyfriars Bridge already identified in the modelling as a driver of rat-running (F5, F6).
 4. Circumstances have materially changed: the evidence base is stale by the council's own consultant's account (F8); the scheme is now being built standalone, without the river crossing embedded in the long-term modelling (F4, F6); and the first assessment competent to see the effect has found it (F9).
 5. The council's own scheme embeds TROs on existing roads as levers for delivering its intended traffic distribution, and the wider package includes through-traffic restriction of residential roads; a C1098 order channels traffic onto the new road and thus serves the scheme's own objective (F7).
 6. The council's own 2018 decision accepted the C1098 is unsuitable for HGVs and refused a weight restriction solely for want of a suitable alternative route. For through cars — the bulk of the forecast induced traffic — the alternative is the A-road network they divert to avoid, so a through-traffic prohibition faces no such obstacle; for HGVs the alternative arrives with the strategic network, at latest Phase 2 — so the order is committed now on a staged, trigger-based basis, and the interim gap is itself the council's own evidence that Phase One leaves the western network incomplete (F13, F4).
 7. Accordingly, the “compelling case in the public interest” for the CPO — and the soundness of any new SRO — is incomplete while the scheme's admitted effect on the C1098 carries no committed mitigation. The objection is resolvable: commit the mitigation, and it falls away.
-

5. The ask

Strategic framing — the C1098 and the case for the full bypass. The C1098 rat run is a relief valve on the A49 Greyfriars Bridge chokepoint: every vehicle diverting via Bridge Sollers is Greyfriars-corridor demand that goes unrecorded at the chokepoint and unmeasured on the rural network. Left unmanaged, it causes the observed evidence base to understate the very problem the Western Relief Road and second river crossing exist to

solve — while the displaced traffic on an unsuitable rural road is itself a quantifiable disbenefit that a future funding case could claim the relief road would cure. Instrumenting the C1098 (monitoring) quantifies the displaced demand for the Phase 2 evidence base; restricting through-traffic returns that demand to the corridor where the strategic case is measured and made. The mitigation package below therefore serves the council's own objective of securing central government funding for the remaining bypass phases, and should be presented as such.

That Herefordshire Council commits, in writing, before the final construction contract award or as a condition of resolving objections to the CPO/SRO:

1. **Baseline and monitoring.** Independent automatic traffic counts on the C1098 before construction begins (pre-December 2026) and at defined intervals post-opening, with classified counts (car/LGV/HGV) and speeds, published openly.
2. **Defined triggers.** Thresholds (flow, HGV proportion, 85th-percentile speed) which, if exceeded, oblige the council to implement a pre-agreed mitigation package without further gatekeeping.
3. **The pre-agreed package**, drawing on the scheme's own precedent (F7), ordered by the evidence: a prohibition-of-through-traffic order and/or a 7.5-tonne weight restriction except for access (the road is 4–7m wide and “not wide enough in many places for 2 HGVs to pass” — F12); physical measures at the river crossing approaches as required; and a speed limit reduction by TRO as a supporting measure, justified by the road's changed function under DfT Circular 01/2013 point 123 once through-traffic is induced (see F12 — the 2018 review assessed speed on the road's local-access function and is silent on volume and composition).
4. **Funding** from the scheme budget, mirroring the treatment of Belmont Road.
5. **Disclosure** of the 2025 traffic study and model outputs for the C1098 (see EIR).

6. Forum strategy

- **CPO objection** (on advertisement): the leverage instrument. Individual household objections plus a group objection built on §4 above, framed as resolvable by the §5 commitments. Identify any statutory objector (land interest within the order) sympathetic to the case — a right to be heard reliably forces an inquiry.
- **SRO objection** (if a new order is advertised): the doctrinal home for the network-effects argument — the pattern of stopping-up and junction arrangements channels traffic toward an unsuitable river crossing. Press meanwhile, via ward councillor/EIR, for the design-conformity position against the 2018 SRO: either a new order (opening the window) or reliance on the old one with a design that has moved (a challenge point).
- **Political route** (runs regardless of the orders): parish council motion adopting §5 as its formal ask; ward councillor questions to the cabinet member; petition under the council's scheme; scrutiny/call-in of the construction contract award decision.
- **Evidence route:** EIR disclosure (below); parish-commissioned ATC survey; continuous camera-based counting (e.g. Telraam) from private property; Community Speedwatch; incident/near-miss log.

- **Legal reserve:** planning counsel input on the CPO objection; JR held in reserve for any new decision that fails to grapple with the induced-traffic objections (6-week/3-month time limits run from each decision — diarise every decision date).

The 10 September 2026 Cabinet gateway

Cabinet considers the “Hereford Bypass Phase One – Assessment Report” on 10 September 2026 (papers ~3 September) — the FBC assessed against criteria adopted 30 April 2026. Hooks on the record: - **April criteria (Strategic Case):** the report must provide a “list of any routes with increase[d] traffic flows or where journey times worsen” — the C1098 must appear or the report fails its own rubric. Accident criteria (“any routes showing increased accidents”) and the EQIA criterion also engage the C1098. - **Scrutiny resolution 8 (20 July 2026):** the assessment criteria are to “include a section on traffic distribution effects, taking into account: a. Localised impacts b. Communities experiencing benefits and c. Communities experiencing adverse effects.” Officers confirmed each criterion receives a RAG rating (minute F.3). Omission of the section, or of the C1098 from it, is a call-in ground. - **Minute E.6:** the committee recorded that reduced city congestion could change traffic patterns affecting rural communities, that some impacts appear only post-opening, and that “before-and-after monitoring would be necessary to assess how traffic redistributed across the network and whether further interventions were required” — the monitoring-and-triggered-intervention ask in the committee’s own words. - **Minutes G.3/H.2:** members queried “whether sufficient information had been provided regarding mitigation measures and their associated costs” for roads experiencing increases, including “residents who currently live on relatively quiet roads.” - **Minute H.3:** officers stated the FBC modelling includes “a detailed distributional impact assessment showing changes in traffic levels, noise and air quality across the wider network” at road-link level (H.6) — this document contains the C1098 figures and is captured by the EIR items on link-level outputs. Plan: public question submitted before the deadline (confirm with democratic services), framed on the April criteria + resolution 8 + E.6; supplementary held for the answer; pre-drafted call-in case with Connected Communities members briefed; 4 Aug and 9 Aug EIR responses due ~1 and ~7 September — if outstanding, cited in the question.

7. Evidence still to obtain

1. The 2025 traffic study in full, with C1098 link outputs, network coding, assignment method (constrained vs demand), forecast years and scenario assumptions on later bypass phases (EIR — s22 basis expired).
2. FBC transport annex and appraisal tables; confirmation of the C1098 induced-traffic figures and any sensitivity tests.
3. Design-conformity assessment against P151314/F approved plans and the 2018 SRO; the council’s position on whether a further SRO is required.
4. Status of AECOM Review §10 (gap analysis) follow-up actions.
5. Baseline C1098 traffic data (resident/parish-commissioned) before construction traffic contaminates it.
6. The **November 2017 seven-day volume survey data** for the two C1098 locations (AD report §9 — speeds released, volumes not), as a second pre-scheme baseline

alongside the Nov 2016 ATC and the Nov/Dec 2017 ANPR through-HGV counts (obtained, F13).

7. CPO/SRO advertisement dates and objection deadlines (weekly watch on Hereford Times public notices; ward councillor to confirm timetable with officers).
8. The **enabling works supplementary planning application** (AECOM screening request 3 July 2026 confirms it is imminent; parcels partly outside the approved red line — design drift evidence). When registered: comment window used to seek a **Construction Traffic Management Plan condition excluding the C1098** from construction/delivery routing — first formal scheme recognition of the road. Also obtain the LPA's screening opinion (due ~24 July 2026) — note the request relies on the 2016 ES that AECOM's own Feb 2024 review found deficient, and concedes ~4 ha against the 1 ha Schedule 2 threshold while the matrix denies Schedule 2 status.

8. Source register

Ref	Document	Key locations used
TA	South Wye Transport Package — Southern Link Road Transport Assessment, Parsons Brinckerhoff, May 2015 (P151314/F doc 77 et seq.)	§§7.2.2, 7.3.1, 7.3.2, 7.3.4, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.4, 8.3.13–8.4.12, 9.2.4, 9.2.12; Figure 7.1
TA App B	TA Appendix B (doc 84): Scoping Note (14 Nov 2014); Highways Agency letter (1 Dec 2014); JMP Technical Note (Mar 2015); PB responses	Scoping §3.4.6; HA letter points 5, 8; JMP §§1.9, 1.10; PB response table
BN	Briefing Note for planning case officer: transport impacts and benefits arising from SLR, PB Technical Note 1, 30 Sep 2015 (doc 122), inc. Figures A–H, 8.9/8.10 Rev A	§§2.2, 2.4–2.6, 3.1, 4 (Tables A–E), 4.16
ES 5.1	ES Vol 2 Appendix 5.1 — Traffic Data for Air Quality (doc 10)	Absence of C1098 (resident-verified)
ES 11.3	ES Vol 2 Appendix 11.3 — DM2017 v DS2032 (doc 88)	Absence of C1098 (resident-verified)
AECOM	Hereford Southern Link Road — Planning Application and Design Review, AECOM, Feb 2024 (project 60715938), Appendix A to New Road Strategy Cabinet report	§§2.2–2.6, 3.2–3.3, 4.2–4.4, 6.3; Tables 1, 4, 5
SoR	Draft Statement of Reasons, HWB Phase 1 CPO 2026 (Appendix 1 to Cabinet report, Dec 2025)	§§1.1–1.8, 5.26
CabDec	Cabinet decision: HWB Phase One Land Acquisition CPO (Dec 2025)	Resolutions b)–d); delegation to deal with objections/withdrawals
IR	FOI Internal Review letter IR2026-00251, Herefordshire Council, 24 Feb 2026	s22 refusal and July 2026 publication commitment
Consult	SWTP public consultation brochure, Jul 2014 (in doc 84)	Weight restriction included in all route options

Ref	Document	Key locations used
RHS	Hereford Transport Model — Report of Highway Surveys, WSP Parsons Brinckerhoff, Sept 2017 (project 70020236; herefordshire.gov.uk/downloads/file/13483)	Figure 2-2 “ATC Site 1 Summary — Bridge Sollers near A438” (drawing 18/11/2016): directional AM/IP/PM/24hr flows, %HGV, average hourly profiles
ADL	C1098 Bridge Sollars speed limit review release (FOI, C. Parnell-Smith): ADL Briefing Note ref 3409, Jan 2018 (Appendix E, redacted); AD Report, Feb 2018; Record of Officer Decision, 9 Mar 2018; Appendices A–D; consultation response summary (Appendix F, redacted)	Briefing note (road characteristics, PIC table, 85th-percentile speeds 33.5–37.7 mph, recommendation); AD report §§4, 9 (TRO waiting list; Nov 2017 seven-day volume/speed surveys); Appendix F (Bishopstone GPC “two briefings [speed and weight restrictions]” and HGV-width comment; ward member “almost to a person” and enforceability; Madley PC 40 mph consensus and commercial-traffic warning)
ADL-W	C1098 weight restriction review release (FOI, C. Parnell-Smith; Drive folder “C1098/2018 Weight and Speed Study”): ADL Briefing Note — Weight Restriction Review, ref 3409, Jan 2018 (redacted); Bridge Sollars (Weight) AD Report, April 2018; Record of Officer Decision, 2 May 2018 (redacted)	“Unsuitable for HGVs” signage at B4352 end only, none at A438 end; passing places; ANPR through-HGV surveys 9 Nov & 6 Dec 2017 (Tables A–B: 64 and 39 two-way, ²¹ / ₁₉ over-7.5t); refusal reason “to avoid increasing the amount of traffic using unsuitable alternatives”; C1185/Bredwardine Bridge (3.7m, single-track) unsuitable, C1098 “the only suitable route”; environmental-restriction test (“better and equally convenient alternative”)
News	Herefordshire Council announcements: FBC publication (Aug 2026); contractor appointment (Mar 2026); Hereford Bypass webpage (construction start Dec 2026, permission secured)	Timeline

Prepared for the C1098 residents’ campaign. This note states the group’s understanding of the public record as at August 2026; corrections on notification of error are welcomed — the group’s interest is in the accuracy of the evidence base, which is precisely what it asks of the council.